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I. Introduction
By the fall of 1998, financial ciises requiring the intervention of the International
Monetary Fund had taken place across Asia and in Russia.' The Fall Agenda of the
Joint meetings of the International Monetary Fund-World Bank were no longer focused
on individual country matters or on merely incremental ways to improve the financial
system.2 Rather, the clear, new focus, as reflected in policy pronouncements from the
IMF itself as well as leading figures such as U.S. Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin and
Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown, was on sweeping international financial law
and institutional reform.3
The threat of out of control financial crises was the stimulus for the policymaker
focus on building what was emerging as the new international financial architecture.
Such an edifice would ensure that domestic financial collapse did not have a "domino
effect" on other nations and that crises could be prevented or contained. Since the
meetings, over thirty-five proposals for strengthening the international financial architec-
ture have arisen.4 The core elements of transparency, internationally accepted standards,
1. See http://www.stern.nyu.edu/globalmicro.html for an exhaustive collection of readings and
documents on the topic [hereinafter Roubini]. See also YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL FINAN-
CIAL AND ECONOMIC LAW 1997 AND 1998 (Joseph J. Norton, ed., 1999).
2. See Roubini, supra note 1. What caused Asia's crisis and its currency crisis and its' global con-
tagion? Charles Adams et al. 1998 International Capital Markets: Developments, Prospects, and
Key Policy Issues (Sept. 1998), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/icm/icm98/;
IMF Staff: The October 1998 World Economic Outlook; Financial Turbulence and the World
Economy (Oct. 1998), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/weo1098/.
3. See http://www.imf.org/external/am/1998/index.htm for detailed fall meeting information.
4. See generally http://www.imf.org/architecture. IMF Staff, Progress in Strengthening the Inter-
national Financial Architecture (July 31, 2000), available at http://www.imf.org/external/
np/exr/facts/arcguide.htm; See Roubini, Reform of the Architecture of the International
Financial System: Alternative Views; See also, Symposium: Law Based Nature of the New Inter-
national Financial Infrastructure, 33 INT'L LAW, (1999).
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financial sector building, private sector involvement, and contingent credit lines are the
new common ingredients required for reform.5
At the same time that the above reform agenda was taking shape, Brazil was engulfed
in its own full-scale financial crisis.6 Facing pressure on its dollar reserves to uphold the
value of the Brazilian real, the Brazilian government, soon after the meetings, began the
difficult process of devaluing the currency by over 35 to 40 percent versus the dollar.7
This resulted in the need for the Brazilian Central Bank, the federal government, and
the IMF and other international financial institutions to work closely together to come
up with a solution to restore certain fundamentals, and to reinstill confidence in the
Brazilian economy and financial system.
The resulting Brazilian crisis was important not just for the Brazilians who had to
face the ramifications of the financial instability on their native soil, but also for the
MERCOSUR trading partners such as Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay.8 The United
States, of course, was also substantially affected due to its considerable investment and
trade position with Brazil. Because of Brazil's position as the eigth largest economy in
the world, the economic security of much of Latin America, and North America, was
seriously, and potentially gravely, affected.
This article will examine the Brazilian crisis from the point of view of an interna-
tional financial law policymaker. Specifically, the objective is to examine how the Brazil-
ian crisis developed, how it was handled, and how the current focus of the IMF and
other international financial institutions to further the international financial architecture
reform process may be effective in helping contain the Brazilian crisis and preventing
further distressing episodes.
Part II of this article sets out the broad parameters of the IMF architectural program.
Part III examines the precursors to the Brazilian real devaluation and focuses on what
was happening internationally as the incipient currency crisis of 1997 emerged into a
full-fledged devaluation debacle. This section also provides a history of the events as
well as suggests what measures might have been taken that could have helped stem the
impending crisis. Part IV broadly reviews the nature of the Brazilian problem for 1998 on
5. See IMF: A Guide to Progress in Strengthening the Architecture of the International Finan-
cial System (Apr. 1999); IMF, Progress in Strengthening the Architecture of the International
Financial System, Oct. 12, 1999 (a full updated report is expected in April 2000).
6. For the best general introduction to the topic, see Roubini, supra note 1, at Brazil and Latin
America, including all relevant IMF, IADB, Central Bark of Brazil (http://www.bcb.gov.br),
and other relevant websites. See IMF-Brazil Letter of Intent, Nov. 13, 1998; R. Waters, Brazil
Debt Roll-over Sparks Fears (FT, Nov. 3, 1998), available at http://www.imf.org/external/
np/loi/1 I 1398.htm; see also Joseph 1. Norton, Asian Contagion and Latin America, REFORM
OF LATIN AMERICAN BANKING SYSTEMs, 285 (Ernesto Aguirre & Joseph J. Norton, eds., 2000).
7. Id. An official devaluation took place on January 15, 1999 with a decision to let the Real
float, including the failure of a massive $41 billion U.S. led capital infusion.
8. MERCOSUR has a provision that provides for macro-economic coordination as one of its
core legal objectives although there are few if any institutional resources that have yet been
allocated to this aspiration and intention. See generally Jorge M. Guira, Mercosur as an Instru-
ment for Development, 3 NAFTA L. & Bus. REV. AM. 53 (Summer 1997); Institute of Inter-
national Finance Regional Overview of Latin America-Mar. 15, 1999 (excellent discussion
of trade implications of Brazilian crisis).
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and the domestic and international response. Part V assesses the legal and institutional
methods used by the IMF to address the issues and poses the question whether the
reforms in progress provide a sufficient intelligence gathering and response mechanism
to minimize the potential disruptions of financial crises.
II. The Core International Financial Architectural Parameters
Whether the issue is economic or military security, the policymaker must first face
the question of defining the problem and devising appropriate strategies and tactics. This
section reviews these issues, in turn.
A. DEFINITION OF CRISIS
For a problem to be perceived as substantial enough to be a crisis, there is no
commonly accepted benchmark or measurement (e.g., what the actual percentage of
obligations outstanding is that cannot be repaid). For purposes of this article, a crisis is
defined as the private sector's or sovereign's inability or impending inability to pay its
foreign or domestic obligations.
The roots of such crisis events, of course, often vary. Certain objective criteria, how-
ever, exist. These include declining terms of trade (decline of oil prices in Venezuela
and Texas in the mid-1980s) and decline in valuation of capital markets (the U.S. great
depression in 1929). Other events, such as bank failures (Argentina 1982, Chile 1985,
Venezuela 1994) and currency drops (Mexican peso devaluation 1994) are further exam-
ples of different major causes of crisis. 9
B. THE BRAZILIAN CRISIS ELEMENTS
The Brazil crisis is primarily based on the devaluation of the currency. It is not a
bank insolvency or liquidity crisis. Moreover, the period from 1997 before devaluation
when concerns existed about the ability of Brazil to maintain its currency value, and
therefore continue to attract foreign investment and pay off its debts, certainly qualify
as either a crisis or pre crisis "crucible" period.
The specific roots of the Brazilian crisis are widely debated. Some take the view that
there were specific structural imbalances based upon too high a public debt relative to
the ability of the country to repay.' ° Other commentators, such as Paul Krugman, suggest
that Brazil's fiscal policies were not really the problem." Rather, it was many factors,
9. See L. Rojas-Suarez & S. R. Weisbrod, BANKING CRISES IN LATIN AMERICA: EXPERIENCES
AND ISSUES (1994).
10. See Jorge M. Guira, British Institute of International and Comparative Law Conference On
Mercosur, The Brazilian Financial Crisis: Operational Considerations, Feb. 19, 1999.
11. See Paul Krugman, Don't Blame It on Rio... or Brasilia Either: The Real Is Caught in a
Confidence Trap, SLATE (Feb. 11, 1999), available at http://slate.msn.com/Dismal/99-02-111
Dismal.asp; Paul Krugman, Alas, Brazil, SLATE (Feb. 1999), available at http://web.mit.edul
Krugman/wivw/ brazil.html; J. Sachs, NBER Session, Brazil Fever, First Do No Harm, Apr. 15,
2000. This argues the IMF over-focused on cutting the debt when the underlying problem
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including the lack of confidence in Brazilians to exercise self-control, stemming from a
post-1960 history of "stop and go" policies that had cheapened the currency repeatedly.
In addition to these specific negative reputation costs, an international climate
of doubt spilling over from Asia and Russia existed. A general belief that speculators
could punish for being out of line with market benchmarks was also a crucial factor.
12
Specifically, the Russian default on syndicated loans triggered a global climate of fear
and psychological unrest that, following sharp falls in crucial Latin American commodity
prices, could not be sated.
Next, the Brazilian consolidation of all public debt, rather than accounting for it, into
state, municipal, and federal units, was also held significant as overstating the true state
of default risk for many investors.' 3 This is important because investors were otherwise
constrained in evaluating creditworthiness by these negative combined parameters. It is
argued that the confluence of these perceived weaknesses, rather than any actual major
problem, led directly to the self-fulfilling prophecy of devaluation.
Although there is little doubt that there could have been certain structural and fiscal
improvements to the Brazilian economic plan, this is shortsighted in minimizing the
preeminent position of confidence in retaining market support for the currency. To the
extent that this more broadly defines the Brazilian crisis, the key issues to resolve are how
the international financial architecture proposals can contribute to crisis prevention and
management through addressing the above fundamentals and the underlying confidence
factor.
C. THE IMF's BROAD STRATEGY AND TARGETED OBJECTIVES
The IMF strategy of prevention has primarily focused on maintenance of confidence
through surveillance and monitoring and on encouraging the adoption of certain inter-
national agreements and policy prescriptions in banking and securities law. Those policy
positions articulate certain fundamental benchmarks that provide guidance as to how
individual country finance should be undertaken. They are complemented by the work
of rating agencies that price a country's debt based upon supposedly objective criteria
or risk."4 Acceptance of certain ratios determines the level of creditworthiness.
Conditional funding was also available under certain conditions when a crisis broke
out. 5 The broad objective of most global efforts prior to the Asian financial crisis that
was what everyone already knew: the Real was overvalued in 1997-98 and it was a matter
of time before some adjustment would be needed. This was due especially to the short-term
debt problem-Brazil had lack of sufficient foreign debt-as well as exporters' inability to
sell goods with Brazil's high rates.
12. See Impact of the Asian Crisis on Latin America (ECLAC 1999), available at http://
web.nps.navy.mil./relooney/3040_633.htm; see also Roubini, supra, note 1, at Contagion to
Russia and Eastern Europe; see G. Calvo, Understanding The Russian Virus (with special refer-
ence to Latin America) (Oct. 1998), available at http://www.bsos.umd.edu/econ/ciecpn3.pdf.
13. See Krugman, supra note 11.
14. See Roubini, supra, note 1, at Rating Agencies: Why Did They Fail to Predict the Asian Crisis?
15. The proper extent of how much funding should actually be permitted based upon a country's
reserves with the IMF is, of course, at the core of the debate, rather than the decision to bail
out Brazil or any of the above countries. This reflects an orthodox perspective on the need
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took place from 1996 on was therefore remarkably similar to the ex ante proposals
advanced in their approach. The major difference, in addition to the heightened sense
of urgency precipitated by the threat of systemic collapse, was the choice of a new set of
tactics to ensure that the above objectives could be successfully implemented. Review-
ing the specific tactical elements is therefore important to assess the "new parameters"
or specifications for risk management in the new international financial architecture.
The next section therefore articulates the core concepts and their limitations as confi-
dence building measures in building the five pillars of the new international financial
architecture.
D. THE IMF CONFIDENCE BUILDING TACTICS AND THEIR CONSTRAINTS
The first objective of transparency is not new. Indeed, transparency has been a hall-
mark of law reform proposals deemed essential to capital markets liberalization and
the attraction of foreign investment. 6 This is because U.S. institutions are often more
reluctant to become financially involved in foreign countries that do not adopt certain
standards, such as generally accepted accounting principles. 7 The IMF's specific empha-
sis, therefore, was to encourage further cooperation with the Special Data Dissemination
Service, and to publicly release internal IMF reports of country finance assessments to
increase opportunities for understanding and standardization."
The problem, of course, is that transparency does not and cannot capture problems
that exist due to private sector mismanagement. Moreover, it may, ironically enough,
unduly punish certain countries for wrongs that they have not committed. In the case of
Asia, broadly speaking, the problem was not the public sector borrowings being unsus-
tainable, but the closed nature of private institutions such as banks. In this sense, the only
solution is tighter internal regulation of banking and investment houses, including less
opaque reporting. The three major credit rating agencies and the IMF, however, largely
failed to focus on this concern in Asia, and better information by public authorities, by
itse,1 would.1 not-~ hav prevenoted t-he Asa rr.,-;i-;c frcnm Aopnpninc
Moreover, as to Brazil, Paul Krugman and others have stressed that the lack of
sophistication and the psychology of self-fulfilling prophecies among investors were more
responsible for the devaluation crisis than the fundamentals. Specifically, the anomaly
in Brazilian law whereby state accounts reflect a fiscal deficit that is accumulated with
federal debt created the basis for an institutional investor misperception of the state
of the health of the Brazilian economy. Standard measurements used by many private
investors to judge Brazil, rather than the absence of any meaningful public benchmarks,
to provide such assistance. See IMF, Brazil-Technical Memorandum of Understanding, July 2,
1999, available at http://www.imf.org/extenal/np/LOI/1999/070200a.htm.
16. For a collection of articles, see Roubini, The Debate on "Crony Capitalism" Is Corruption
Bad for Economic Growth?, and Corporate Governance in Asia and Around the World: The
Asian Model vs. the Anglo-Saxon Model. See Norton, supra note 6, at 311-14; IMF-Progress
in Strengthening the Architecture of the International Financial System, Oct. 12, 1999.
17. See Norton, supra note 6, at 311-14; Basle Committee review of international accounting
standards (No. 70, Apr. 2000).
18. See Roubini, supra note 1, Sources of Official Data and Reports, IMFs Dissemination Stan-
dards Bulletin Board (DSBB); see also IMF, supra note 16.
Fall 2001 487
was instead a core problem of perception. Still, there is no question that reducing capacity
and raising disclosure standards, even if this introduces additional costs and transfers
the playing field for creative use of financial information, is highly desirable.
The second strategy is the development of internationally accepted standards. 9 What
this means precisely is codes of general ethical conduct as well as specific regulatory and
supervisory banking and securities practices. Additional work in accountancy (Interna-
tional Accounting Standards Board), corporate governance (OECD), securities (IOSCO),
banking (Basle), and in social policy areas (the respective development banks and the
World Bank) comprise the institutional support for these new developments. 2 0 There
is little question that, despite the sensitivity of this area in domestic political environ-
ments who do not like such "soft law" imposed on them, such institutional development
serves a highly positive social purpose.2 1 In addition, it may also have unanticipated con-
sequences, such as allowing leaders of many countries to do the politically unpopular,
because the IMF and other standard setting bodies with market influence require it.
The third strategy is complemented by the financial sector-strengthening program of
the IMF-.2 2 This consists of continuous country assessment and Basle cooperation. Con-
tinuous country assessment did not prevent the last set of crisis from Asia. The rapidity
of electronic international financial movements, opportunities for regulatory arbitrage in
cross-border transactions, off-balance sheet instrumentation that derivatives provide to
embed risk in transactions to unwary investors, and the lack of an international lender
of last resort present substantial challenges that assessment alone cannot fix. Basle, to its
substantial credit, has been working on many such issues in an inclusive manner with
emerging economies rather than maintaining an aloof posture. 23 Such cooperation is
vital to the implementation of rapid response monitoring systems for capital flows.
The fourth strategy is greater private sector involvement to mitigate the moral hazard
problem, such as where banks or other financial institutions are too big to fail so they
must be rescued. 24 There is no doubt that the proliferation of bond finance rather
19. See IMF, supra note 18, note 5.
20. See Roubini, supra note 1, Bank Supervision and Regulation and Reform of Basle Capi-
tal Adequacy Standards; Specific websites include http://www.bis.org, http://www.iosco.org,
http://www.ibrd.org.
21. See Joseph Gold, The Rule of Law in the International Monetary Fund, Pamphlet Series No. 32
(IMF 1980) for the seminal discussion of this topic.
22. See IMF, supra note 16, Goldstein and Turner, Banking Crises in Emerging Economies: Ori-
gins and Policy optioihs (lIE, Oct. 1996); see also IMF, Financial Stability in Emerging Markets
(Dec. 1997), available at http://www.bis.org, supra note 20, Report of the G-10 Working
Party on Financial Stability in Emerging Markets, Financial Stability in Emerging Market
Economies: A Strategy for the Formulation, Adoption, and Implementation of Sound Princi-
ples and Practices to Strengthen Financial Systems (Apr. 1997); see also the work of Goldstein
on Building Robust financial systems in http://www.iie.org.
23. See generally Roubini, supra note 1, Do We Need an International Lender of Last Resort and
Hedge Funds and Derivatives and Systemic Risk; see also Rosa. Lastra, The International Last
Lender of Resort, BRITISH JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY
(Oct. 1999); The Three Reports of the G-22 Group on International Financial Architecture
Reform (Oct. 1998).
24. See Roubini, supra note 1, Moral Hazards; see also Olsen, Banks in Distress: Misdirection in
Public Policy and Law (Kluwer, forthcoming 2000).
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than syndicated loans as the mainstay of developing country finance make decision-
making regarding debt substantially more unwieldy than in the days when syndicated
loan creditors could all be gathered in one room to take collective action.2 ' Accordingly,
appropriate reforms to adjust to this new reality are most urgently needed.
The fifth strategy of contingent credit lines is based on alleviating temporary bal-
ance of payments problems for countries with strong policies.26 This, of course, builds
on the special drawing rights facilities based upon the IMF Article I confidence building
to prevent "mal-adjustments in the balance of payments... destructive of national or
international prosperity" but is a new "preemptive" measure. There is no dispute that
strong legal, economic, and political risk management to avoid escalation of dangerous
situations that threaten the public good of international confidence is a potentially help-
ful measure. The problem, of course, is determining standards and sophisticated country
judgment as to when it is prudent to provide help and when the IMF may merely be
enabling destructive behavior that is market self-correcting.
III. History and Development of the Brazilian Crisis
A. PRECURSORS OF THE CRISIS: THE BRAZILIAN ECONOMY
HAS A STOP AND Go PATTERN
The June 1994 Real plan stabilized the economy through the introduction of a
new currency loosely tied to the dollar. The plan broadly consisted of combining tight
monetary policy (Ml money circulation was 2.5 in 1994 compared to 3.8 in 1996)
and loose fiscal policy and incentives to attract portfolio foreign investment, such as
privatization..
27
The plan succeeded in reducing inflation from a 640% annual rate to less than
18 percent within one year.2' This allowed for business and consumers to plan their
budgets. The effect of increased certainty was greater spending on goods and services:
a consumption and related credit boom, particularly in the purchase of foreign goods
among the top 10 percent of the population who control over 50 percent of disposable
spending.
29
The economy was now in a clear "go" stage. Indeed, too much of a "go" stage. The
banking authorities became concerned about over-heating of the economy and cut back
on credit in 1995. The overall inflation rate was 23.2 percent in 1995 and 16 percent in
1996.
25. This is an observation made by Lee Buchheit of Cleary, Gottleib, Steen, and Hamilton at
a CCLS/QMW Conference on Reform of the International Financial Architecture Confer-
ence (May 1999); see also Joseph Norton, International Syndicated Lending and Economic
Development in Latin America: The Legal Context, EssAYs IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL AND
ECONOMIC LAW (1997).
26. See IMF, supra note 16.
27. See IMF-Brazil Letter of Intent, supra note 6.
28. Id.
29. Euromonitor, Brazil: Retail Trends (1999) (proprietary research).
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B. LIBERALIZATION MOVES FORWARD
The Finance Minister who introduced the Real Plan, former California Berkeley
Sociology Professor Fernando Henrique Cardoso, became President of the Republic. He
implemented the liberalization through privatization of key sectors such as mining and
oil, with telecommunications and ports to follow. The idea was that increased selling-
off of state owned enterprises would increase the competitiveness of such industries and
stimulate massive foreign investment flows. This has happened, with over $18 billion in
new capital flowing in and substantially more on its way expected prior to the end of
1998.
Brazil is the key player in MERCOSUR, the regional customs union.30 It is therefore
wed to a common external tariff (CET) of 14 percent, although many exemptions exist,
and the automobile and sugar sector is exempted.3 A large and growing percentage of
trade is developing regionally rather than globally as the relevant local economies benefit
from harmonization of legal and customs policies that reduce costs and promote other
synergies.
The above tariff rate was expected to diminish over time, but a 1997 policy reversal
meant that tariff rates rose to 17 percent average. MERCOSUR member states, during
1997, continued to boom, although later economic shocks did take place.
3 2
No major regional financial services liberalization measures have been undertaken,
either unilaterally or through MERCOSUR, although there are working groups in MER-
COSUR (Financial System Commission of Sub-Group four) to advance this end. 33 Some
positive steps in linking the stock exchanges in each country through broad ranging
cooperative agreements and setting regional supervisory standards have been made.
34
Brazil is involved in the GATS negotiations, as are the other MERCOSUR states.
The over $400 billion banking sector in Brazil is administered through the National
Monetary Council (NMC), the Central Bank, Banco de Brasil (the federal government
bank), the Securities Commission (the CVM), the National Development Bank (BNDES),
and public and private financial institutions. The NMC is the key group and is comprised
of the Minister of Finance, the Planning and Budget minister, and the Central Bank
president. The Central Bank follows the rules of the NMC. The bank is responsible for
regulation and supervision of the banking system.
30. See Thomas O'Keef , LATIN AMERICAN TRADE AGREEMENTS (1997); see also IMF-Brazil, supra
note 27, at 2. See http://www.intr.net/mercosur for all relevant agreements including the
initial Treaty of Asuncion.
31. See YEARBOOK, supra note 1; Guira and Tavarone, Mercosur: Consolidation Among Thrmoil,
p. 43.
32. See Brazil Inflation Up, Output Down (Assoc. PRESS, Feb. 12, 1999); Diderich, Brazil Debt
Dispute Overshadows Trade Summit, REUTERS (Feb. 12, 1999); Documents also available of
trade summit meetings held in the Mercosur website, supra note 30.
33. See Era Holz, Legislative Asymmetry and the Integration of Banking in Mercosur: A Preliminary
Approach, (SELA, Oct. 1997).
34. See REFORM AND RENEWAL: CURRENT REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS IN LATIN AMERICAN CAP-
ITAL MARKETS, (Anne Stetson & Antonio E. Stolper, eds., 1996); see also Mercosur website
supra note 30 for an on-line listing of documents. The Mercosur Administrative Secretariat
in Montevideo, Uruguay is the repository for all documents.
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Many banks were taken over after the Real plan was put into effect due to poor
management.3" The most spectacular failure was the demise of Banco Nacional, which
was riddled with fraud; most of its functions were transferred to another private bank,
Unibanco, with the interim administration and approval of the Central bank.
The privatization of the state banking sector thereafter began to take place, with
the Rio de Janeiro state bank sale, as well as one of the larger Minas Gerais banks. The
state of Sao Paulo bank was scheduled to be sold and was sold before the end of 1998.
This is an important trend because the state banks have sometimes been perceived as
fonts of corruption for unscrupulous state politicians to reward political friends (Indeed,
this policy of "patronage banking" has long historical antecedents going back to the
nineteenth century.36).
Due to the above consolidation, many jobs were lost in the commercial banking
sector, in particular. Because of low current valuations and an opening up to foreigners,
these banks were viewed as a ripe target for mergers and acquisitions activity. The extent
to which these purely foreign banks (as opposed to foreign participation in domestic
banks) have been made welcome is evidenced by the increase of over 100 percent in the
1994-96 period in foreign assets.37
C. THE CRUNCH COMMENCES: 1997
The Real plan saw the monetization of the currency to the dollar from other money
substitutes; the end of indexation of currency; the slow increase of credit, other than
overnight funds borrowing; the beginning of the privatization process; and the incipient
flow of foreign funds.
But these positives did not and could not hide the surging current account deficit.
By 1997, the government's deficit was taking up over 30 percent of GDP, not to mention
the large overall public sector debt of 32 percent, soaking up domestic savings, effectively
driving up interest rates, crowding out other investment.3" The relatively high, albeit
more relaxed. degree of regulation which exists in the Brazilian capital markets, as com-
pared to liberalizing regimes like Argentina and Chile, also contributed to distortions in
capital flows.
In sum, the Brazilians were forced to find the right tools to maintain the value of
their currency. Monetary policy restraint, exercised through tight money growth, credit
constraints, and relatively high interest rates were the tools available to help prop up the
Real.
Fiscal policy problems relating to state government pensions and the size of the civil
service in certain key states left the growing impression that Brazilian state creditors
might not be able to pay their foreign exchange obligations, thus putting pressure on
the federal government to devalue the currency. Bringing in record quantities of direct
35. See IMF-Brazil Letters of Intent, supra note 27, at 1. Apparently more than forty banks were
closed, according to Brazilian Central Bank sources, but the exact number could not be
confirmed.
36. See Thomas E. Skidmore, & Peter H. Smith, MODERN LATIN AMERICA (1992).
37. See Brazilian Central bank website, supra note 6, at Bulletin, Statistical Tables and Annual
Report (1997).
38. See IMF-Brazil Letter of Intent, supra note 6, 27, at 2-3.
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foreign investment helped to alleviate this negative perception but did not cover up the
fundamental long-term perception of the problem. Indeed, only one year after launch,
the IADB's review of IMF statistics showed the Real was now at .92:1, down significantly
from a par value of 1:1 to the dollar at launch.3 9
Under these conditions, the downside risk was that the Real was not only increas-
ingly perceived as overvalued; absent strong government policy to address the fiscal
issues, it seemed to have no other way to go but down. Indeed, in the summer of 1997,
noted MIT economist Rudiger Dornbusch said that Brazil's Real currency was in real
trouble, owing to the disequilibrium in the above numbers.4" The major positives were
that foreign investment was coming in strong, the current account deficit was easily
financed for six months based on existing international reserves (in contrast to Mexico's
1994 liquidity problems), and the U.S. dollar upon which the Real was monetized was
relatively steady.
For the next five months or so since Dornbusch's summer pronouncement, nothing
much happened, at least in Brazil. Outside, of course, Thailand went into financial crisis,
Indonesia and Malaysia were in clear trouble, and hints that Korea and Japan might
need reserves to prop up the value of their currencies drew the increasing attention and
concern of international banking authorities.
Whether the causes were attributable to closed financial systems, a speculative bubble
in the property market, corruption, lax accounting, and bank supervisory systems, one
point was clear: an IMF bail-out of these economies, with a substantial element of legal
reform conditions, seemed to be on its way and needed.
Concurrently, stock markets around the world, most importantly the U.S. market,
had reacted to the October 1997 drop in the Hong Kong Hang Seng Index, with a short,
sharp, but ultimately modest, correction of less than 10 percent. The reason is that the
market did not perceive that massive collapse was in order in the U.S. markets.
Confidence and calm were preserved as major U.S. financial leaders pronounced the
correction taking place as business as usual; earlier pronouncements that over-allocation
of assets in the stock market could result in a speculative bubble seemed to have inocu-
lated the market from any psychological panic or distress.4'
Without question, the U.S and Brazilian markets are highly linked. Unfortunately
for the Brazilian market, the leading exchange, the Sao Paulo Bolsa, or the BOVESPA,
dropped dramatically in response to every shift. In fact, the market dropped over
82 percent from the beginning of the year.4 2
This event, on top of increasing pressure on the currency markets, made it clear that
serious asset allocation out of Brazil would result in hedge fund portfolios if corrective
39. See http://www.iadb.org, Social and Economic Statistics, Statistical database section.
40. See Roubini, supra note 1, Brazil and Latin America, Brazil's Incomplete Stabilization and
Reform by Rudi Dornbusch (1997); see also Dornbusch, Brazil and the IMF (Nov. 12, 1998).
Dornbusch's comments were widely publicized in various media, such as Business Week, and
other influential mainstream and popular publications.
41. The statements and testimony of Chairman Greenspan before the Joint Economic Com-
mittee, U.S. Congress, Oct. 29, 1997, available at http://wwv.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/
testimony/1997/19971029.htm.
42. See generally http://www.bovespa.com.br for documents relating to price history of assets in
various monthly bulletins and other official publications.
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action were not taken to restore confidence in the Brazilian Real. The impending crisis
was not arising from short-term liquidity problems or insolvency but from the perception
that its currency value could not be sustained.
From the vantage point of 1997, the key elements precipitating crisis were fiscal
or perceived fiscal overspending, the lack of political will to address the problem, and
the perception of Real over valuation. The Brazilian and U.S. stock market fall in Octo-
ber 1997, indirect contagion due to the psychological effect of the Asian crisis, and the
growing perception that unfavorable speculative pressure was building were other key
negatives.
The fundamental issues to be addressed were ensuring broad government reform on
key fiscal issues and providing the political will to educate citizenry on the need to absorb
short-term pain to ensure long-term gain. Reinstilling confidence in the domestic stock
market and monitoring negative spillovers from the U.S. stock market correction was
also important. Defending the currency at an appropriate level after the Asian contagion
dampened confidence in emerging markets was becoming a major problem without an
easy solution.
D. RESPONSE TO GROWING CRISIS
1. Denial
Shortly after the Sao Paulo stock exchange suffered drastic falls, there was pub-
lic sentiment of confidence expressed in the overall need to take action to reform the
economy drastically. This sentiment soon changed as the painful reality of stabilization
medicine, such as cutting public spending drastically, and raising interest rates higher,
came into sharper focus.
2. Central Bank Action
The first public signal that Brazil recognized it was in a potential crisis was the
Central Bank's decision to increase its interest rate from about 22 to 43 percent.43 It was
now clear that something in the market persuaded the Brazilian authorities that strong
and decisive corrective action was urgently needed.
3. Presidential Action
Throughout 1997 and beyond, President Cardoso rallied the country with a call to
fiscal prudence, declaring that he would attempt to push through a civil service reform
plan (and some other fiscal measures such as pension reform) to address the need to
correct imbalances and restore international confidence in Brazil. Within a matter of
days, the proposal was prepared and delivered to Congress, over the opposition of major
Sao Paulo unions and the leader of his own party who said that the party would not be
decreed to on such a painful issue.
43. IMF-Brazil Letter of Intent, supra note 6, at 2-3; Waters, supra note 6.
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4. Congressional Voting
Three hundred fifty votes in the lower chamber were needed for the proposed $9 bil-
lion reduction package to be approved. Brazilian politics does not flow along party lines
since it has a strong personalist, local patronage component, such that the vote was
expected to be close. Indeed, mustering the votes for this package or the less ambitious
$3 billion package was also perceived as not so easy.
5. Coordination with the IMF
Through the end of 1997, the situation was one of consultation only. This approach,
whether it was real or merely on the surface, seemed sensible, as further crisis avoidance
rather than active involvement was the right dose of public diplomacy required to main-
tain still-existing confidence levels. Given that the effective real (as opposed to nominal)
exchange rate was perceived to be anywhere from 10 to 30 percent less than its peg,
further close consultation was clearly needed.44
E. PREVENTION OF DEEPENING CRISIS: EVALUATION OF CRISIS
MANAGEMENT OPTIONS AND LASTING REFORM PROSPECTS
1. Crisis Management
The sense of crisis appeared to have been seized upon as an opportunity to make
needed correction before an even more unreal Real is perceived as the unit of exchange.
For example, the Brazilian Central Bank November 1997 Bulletin reflects that the banking
system appears sound, with no damaging capital surges that can be discerned either into
or out of the country.
2. Central Bank and Government Options
Obviously, guessing at what the Brazilian authorities with or without the assistance
of the IMF would do next was scenario specific. There were numerous scenarios that
hedge fund managers could draw up in trying to decide whether, and in what proportion,
to allocate their assets. Assuming the reform of Brazilian fiscal policy takes place, a
gradual devaluation could still be in order or it might be possible to "buy time" using
one of the instruments described below.
Assuming the fiscal/civil service reform plan either fully or partially did not go into
effect, the increased pressure was likely to result in either further tightening of monetary
policy (if possible) and further liberalization.
It also seems that the Brazilians agreement to raise the MERCOSUR CET to
17 percent would raise some additional revenues, to the extent the bulk of these goods
are price inelastic and not subject to any other substitutions. Indeed, the widening
trade deficit of over $5 billion represents a cause of concern that only increased
competitiveness, not protectionism, will cure.
44. Id.
494 Law and Business Review of the Americas
3. Lasting Reform Prospects
From the vantage point of 1997 crisis management, whether the current crisis yields
to a process of reform depends heavily on the results of the congressional reaction to
the proposed plan, the public mood, and the degree of recession, including the outcome
of the Presidential and other electoral contests. Brazil's president is in a unique position
to voluntarily ask citizens to accept pain before rather than after the election to maintain
greater price stability over the long run.
Such a political position may work, because the alternative of a return to rampant
hyperinflation seems worse and is a prospect not so far away in memory. There also
do not appear to be any creditable alternatives that can carry the presidential banner.
This is because Pedro Maluf is perceived by many to be a captive of the much more
radical Socialists, and Cardoso is, by contrast, respected as a reasonably honest politician,
who has not been dogged by any of the vote-buying scandals which have afflicted other
prominent politicians this year.4"
To the extent banking law reform and related economic measures are contemplated,
the next section discusses the specific approaches that could be used to prevent further
crisis.
F. How LEGAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE COULD HELP SPECIFICALLY
AND MORE BROADLY TO REDUCE THE PROSPECTS FOR THE SITUATION
TO BECOME CATASTROPHIC
At the beginning of 1998, the following legal and economic advice represents some
of the more salient co-coordinated policy options available to contain crisis.
1. Legal Options
The first step available to policymakers is to review opportunities to use various
short-term fa-cilitie with the IMF in confidential manner. Setting targets for key num-
bers can determine whether the currency appears to be sliding, in addition to the floating
peg itself. For example, the ratio of M1 as a percentage of international cash reserves
discloses much about the seriousness of the domestic authorities to their commitment
to price stability.
A second step is to discuss possibilities for macroeconomic coordination with the
United States and other major creditors. This should be done on an informal basis,
tracking the APEC approach wherein the IMF is the lead player. Nevertheless, securing
United States support for such assistance may not be so easy, given the Republicans
rebuff of Clinton's pledge to provide the IMF with additional capital suggests that legisla-
tive efforts to provide exchange stabilization if the situation worsens substantially seems
currently unlikely.
The third step is to discuss possibilities for macroeconomic co-ordination with
MERCOSUR. One of the key intentions of the 1990 Treaty of Asuncion is macroeco-
nomic coordination. It seems reasonably clear that since the Argentine peso is likewise
pegged to the dollar and that its economy turns in large part on the degree to which it
45. Reid, Brazil's Bright Future, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 26, 1999.
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can export products to Brazil, a regional partnership agreement, even if primarily sym-
bolic, sends a signal of solidarity, which is helpful. There is, however, no MERCOSUR
Development Bank or other institution with reserve capacity to be of assistance. Chile,
although an associate member, could also be of help. The coordination of member states
with the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) is possible, as took place after the
Mexican crisis."
The fourth step is ensuring that the central bank uses its authority wisely to ensure
appropriate measures are taken. These include:
(i) Authorization for a central pool of information about borrowers to monitor
risk with release of this information to Brazilian banking supervisory authorities
to outside regulatory and supervisory bodies for purposes of monitoring liq-
uidity risk. The particular target here is monitoring the potential for capital
flight through surveillance and disclosure requirements. Existing memorandum
of understandings (mou) with the U.S. SEC, Commodities Future and Trading
Commission (CFTC), Argentina, and Paraguay already exist.
(ii) Training of staff who can understand consolidated accounting methods used in
foreign branches and overseas offices; tighter enforcement of domestic account-
ing standard to ensure greater transparency. The purpose here is to ensure that
the possibility of excessive loss of funds through various transfer mechanisms
is provided for through innovative recharacterization of transactions. This is
important because valuation of banking assets is critical to any underlying issue
relating to liquidity.
(iii) Strict tax enforcement. A specific concern here is enforcement of the 7 percent
entry tax on entry of short-term capital flows, with longer-term borrowings
having tax reduced on a sliding scale. This tool is a means to deter flight and
provide for a higher quality of funds to come in, in the first instance.
(iv) Interest rate setting at high levels relative to external Brady bonds. The economic
reasoning for this is to encourage arbitrageurs to come in and buy domestic
Brazilian bonds, which rose dramatically in 1997, in line with the interest rate
rise, rather than going out on the external Brady market. The importance of
this sound policy is to keep the current account strong with strong currency
reserves.
(v) Upholding the Basle requirements of at-risk capital (implemented in 1994). This
is needed in order to maintain capital requirements that help ensure public
confidence in the banking system.
2. Economic Options
A first step is further maintenance of sophisticated information technology systems
to track liquidity flows.
A second tool is for the Central Bank to buy dollars, such that currency speculators
have limited incentives to fight the Central Bank's pricing of the Real. Indeed, to the
extent the international market is thin in Reals, this makes sense as part of a portfolio
strategy; you can't sell short what you can't get. Specifically, this sends a signal to nervous
46. See generally Douglas W. Arner, The Mexican Peso Crisis of 1994-1995: Implications for the
Regulation of Financial Markets, 2 NAFTA L. & Bus. REV. AM. (1996).
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international bankers that short-term foreign debt exposure can be covered and that
the government is taking places to support the Real. This may not help Brazil with any
market interpretation that the currency value is truly unsustainable due to high budget
deficits, market psychology, or short-term debt and exporter's inability to finance goods
due to the high value of the currency. However, more reserves, if corrective action is
taken, is better than nothing.
The answer to whether the latter component of this strategy is feasible depends upon
an empirical evaluation of the situation. If the market is a difficult one to become a
major player in, gradually selling Reals makes more sense, so that if a devaluation arises,
it is much smaller than it would otherwise be because of the strength of the economic
fundamentals.
In addition, another alternative for the government or central bank may be to fash-
ion an OTC transaction(s) where as an undisclosed principal, they intervene with some
novel products to protect their currency. There are a variety of bond-based products, in
addition to currency-based products, which are highly correlated, and in which the Bank
possesses superior information as to its own policy. Depending upon the degree of thin-
ness in the market, this is another way for the Brazilians to possibly protect themselves,
and even to flourish.
3. Integrated Legal and Economic Options
The above suggestions are not addressed to problems of concentration of wealth
(certain leading families dominate the private banking sector, for example). Neverthe-
less, the degree of independence of the central bank and key government agencies is of
paramount importance.
Reducing the long-term possibility of corruption through true financial liberalization
with foreign parties and increased international oversight is a long-term concern that
also deserves some attention as the Brazilian banking sector modernizes further. This is
particularly true in the state banking sector in the federal regime and the commercial
G. "Cralff~ lll , inl thc¢ lact~l .I Ci O~ talized L bank.
Likewise, the current situation is not one where the large Brazilian banking sector
is confronting the specter of a high number of non-performing loans. Careful action,
backed up by the government's response now and potential international assistance,
can help anticipate the need for increased dollar liquidity, so that banks have prepared
themselves for a worsening economic situation with greater dollar reserves.
IV. The Crisis Unfolds and the International
Community Responds
A. THE POLITICAL-BUSINESS CYCLE IN BRAZIL
The year 1998 was a presidential election year in Brazil. What this meant, of course,
was that the party in power had a strong incentive to maintain itself with economic
policies that were designed to keep the currency strong, the economy growing at a fast
rate, and to minimize inflation.
The international financial community had a slightly different agenda. While it also
had a strong desire to see that Brazil remained prosperous, its more focused concern
was to protect its direct and portfolio investments there.
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The 1998 campaign was a show of contrasts. Cardoso promised that he would con-
tinue to push for reforms that would reduce the bureaucracy and supported pension
"right sizing" in the larger Brazilian states. He promised above all to keep the currency
strong and to serve as the voice of reason to the outside world of Brazil's seriousness
in maintaining fiscal and monetary policies that promoted price stability. Even to his
doubters, Cardoso positioned himself as not only the savior of Brazil through the formu-
lation and implementation of the Real plan, but also as the lesser of two evils compared
to his socialist rival. With crisis looming but credibility at home and abroad higher
than his counterpart, Cardoso played the economic cards in a sufficiently skillful way to
garner an easy re-election victory.
But the party was not to last long. The above-articulated problems of short-term
debt levels building up had not been resolved and the central bank's interest rate tighten-
ing policies had not sufficiently reduced demand for borrowings. The fact of the primary
surplus, when viewed against international fiscal standards, should have been impressive,
but was ignored in light of state inaction to address under-funded pension and other
liabilities to international and domestic creditors.
In sum, Brazil had an overall debt of 8 percent of its gross domestic product that,
depending upon your point of view, either was too high or was perceived to be too high.
Lack of confidence to pay back the debt had been growing as short-term interest rates
climbed, but these were the only sources to repay debt. Paradoxically, short-term interest
rates would not be so punitive, if there was confidence in the ability to repay the debt.
The logic of investment in Brazil had now created a vicious circle. Cardoso's policy
of increasing foreign investment, privatization, and a real pegged to the dollar were
intended to create a virtuous circle of stable, investment-led growth. This effort, however,
could not sustain confidence in the wake of unforeseen Asian and Russian crises that
had seen currencies pummeled by speculators. Interest rate rises to prop the perception
that the central bank had sufficient dollar reserves and that President Cardoso had the
political will to sustain the real to its pegged value could not hold, if confidence in the
real fell on the international markets.
Indeed, only two weeks after his October re-election, President Cardoso ordered
his finance minister to start the process leading to the devaluation of the Real. The virtu-
ous circle had turned vicious and a new cycle-facing the harsh reality of devaluation-
was about to begin.
B. THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION: THE CAPITAL FLOWS CLIMATE
AND THE PROBLEM OF SPECULATION
At the time of the Brazilian devaluation, confidence in the international financial
system had been shaken. The IMF had embarked on an exhaustive program of con-
ditional lending through 1997-98, and serious concerns were expressed that its special
drawing rights and other liquidity facilities could not cope with a crisis of this scale.
Criticism of the IMF failure to spot the problem early was widely criticized.
But of course, the IMF was in a trap. If indeed it did indicate that it lacked con-
fidence in an economic program, such as that of Brazil, it could itself cause a crisis
atmosphere. In addition, it could not, short of advocating currency controls for country
implementation, propose policies that constrained investors and corporate financial offi-
cers to-quite correctly-"vote with their currency hedging policies" when they lose con-
fidence in the domestic governments' ability to uphold price stability. Indeed, financial
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discipline via the market workings of the currency market actually encouraged prudent
government policies.
But to some extent, some of the problems extant were due to the overly positive
perceptions of investors regarding the fortunes of emerging market financial products.
For example, let's say a currency speculator decides that he wants to take a position on
emerging markets currency, the Brazilian Real, the Chicago Board of Trade, the Chicago
Merc, Liffe, or any of a series of other exchanges. The trader knows that the option has
been priced to anticipate expectations of certain events over time that reflect a pricing
trend in the currency commodity. Indeed, if the price movement is perceived to be too
one-sided (e.g. everybody thinks the real will drop) then no trades will be executed,
because no market exists.
The same dynamic exists in the over the counter (OTC) market. This time, how-
ever, trillions of dollars of securities deals, far dwarfing the size of Wall Street and the
City stock exchanges transactions, takes place between parties on an individual con-
tractually tailored basis. Products are developed to sell to investors, based on black box
proprietary formulas, seeking to capture market under-valuations, growth curves or tax
advantages, and sometimes all three.
Emerging markets have benefited from these products because they have been used
as methods to repackage sales of bonds and other financial items as linked to "bets" on
market behavior, such as the degree to which a bond rises or falls during a given period.
Sometimes, such products can be engineered as tax advantaged because they arise in
an offshore jurisdiction in the Caribbean or Mauritius, and are executed by a charitable
party, thus guaranteeing better tax treatment if not outright exclusion from one level of
taxation.
Each of the above types of transactions can present the hypothetical investor with
a higher yield curve with no greater degree of risk. This argument of an "emerging
markets free lunch" has in fact been used as a staple for investing in equities in emerging
markets. The comparable argument for bond yields is more difficult to make, as the risk
IL, VVfU Iati LUr Ve, I onsI psfll More 1.a aIl Jlst ,,ra Ilai htfLor wlir.
All of these above products, unforeseen in the days of designing the Bretton Woods
international financial system, are not closely regulated. These products are responsible
for a tremendous percentage of short-term capital flows in emerging and developed
markets alike. For well-managed firms, they present rich trading opportunities. Major
investment firms may make as much as 40 percent of recent profits from proprietary
trading activities, and no doubt much of this profit is embedded deep within the contract
fine print of the over-the-counter trade.47 And as long as both parties make money, who
cares?
47. See Roubini, supra note 1, Derivatives, Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk. A good overview of
the post-LTCM landscape as to core risk management issues is the Report of the President's
Working Group on Financial Markets, Hedge Funds, Leverage, and the Lessons of Long-
Term Capital Management (Apr. 29, 1999). The 40 percent figure cited above is based upon
Frank Portnoy, FIASCO: BLOOD IN THE WATER ON WALL STREET (1996). The compendium
of documents produced by the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, Volume Two-
Advanced Supervisory Methods, includes a detailed discussion of the bank's disclosure and
accounting for trading activities (Apr. 1997), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc003.
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When a bet goes against the value of an emerging markets currency, like the Brazilian
Real, such bets can cost a Central bank precious reserves. A Bank must therefore find
some kind of money that can help stabilize the market, usually dollars or other high
quality paper. It will then enact policies to show that it is not about to go out and print
money; this robs the currency of more value, as it inflates its way out of the squeeze.
This type of scenario is not what took place in Brazil, but it was the case in Malaysia
and Indonesia.4" It ended up costing the IMF lots of money as it helps stabilize the
economy and directly costs taxpayers in all the major developed countries substantial
sums of money, since they are the major underwriters of the Fund. In addition, the major
developed countries can sometimes be called upon to underwrite exchange stabilization
pacts, as was the case with the U.S. loans to Mexico, after the 1994 peso crisis.
49
The game of chance that the speculators are engaging in above is encouraged by
the market and has long been a staple of financial history in some form or another
(Rothschild supposedly made his initial fortune by capitalizing on the fall of the French
currency and the rise of the British that would follow Napolean's defeat at Waterloo. John
Maynard Keynes, a Cambridge and Harvard economist, and prominent U.S. economic
advisor Martin Feldstein, are reputed to have made large fortunes on successful currency
bets).
What has changed is that currency or related bets on bonds, equities, interest rates,
or proxy financial instruments can bring down an economy quickly. It is the speed of
the financial transactions, along with their leveraged size, that kills. It is difficult to be
responsive when you don't really see the calamity coming.
C. THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE
AND THE BRAZILIAN STABILIZATION PROGRAM
The IMF and Brazil jointly announced a support package on November 17, 1998.
Brazil requested $18.1 billion for three years with $4.5 billion in special drawing rights
reserve funds.5 ' This was to be phased in various increments and was conditional upon
the meeting of certain fiscal targets. The World Bank and the Inter-American Devel-
opment Bank likewise stated their intention to commit over $4.5 billion towards social
support programs, priority public investments and public administration, and small
business credits.
51
The justification for support was that the Real had come under significant pressure
due to the Asian crisis. The 43.5 percent interest rate set for overnight lending and
the government's revenue raising measures, amounting to 2.5 percent of gross domestic
product, were deemed ineffective in stemming the crisis.5 2 The effect of such policies
causing the pain of higher unemployment rising from 6 percent to 7.5 percent through
48. Cf Roubini, Malaysia and Indonesia.
49. See U.S. GAO REPORT, Mexico's Financial Crisis: Origins, Assistance, and Initial Efforts to
Recover (GAO-GGD-96-56Feb. 23, 1996).
50. IMF Brazil-Letter of Intent, supra, note 6.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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1998, and higher consumer prices had lowered incomes, without dampening consumer
demand sufficiently.5 3
The mid-July figure of $70 billion in reserves had dwindled to just under $46 billion
after the October 1998 elections and the IMF-World Bank meetings announcing the
initiatives to formulate a new international financial architecture. 4 The announcement
of devaluation was a foregone conclusion before the elections as sustaining the value of
the Real at its previous levels could not be maintained.
In sum, hindsight suggests that of the policy prescriptions stated above as crisis
management tools, none could have prevented the crisis, with the possible, albeit dubi-
ous prospect of massive OTC speculation by Brazil on its own behalf in the currency
markets. Whether because of Real weakness or the perception that the reforms of pen-
sion trimming and such were not sufficiently satisfying, the conclusion is the same, that
increased international and domestic coordination could not have prevented, although
they could have contained, the devaluation crisis.
The policy reforms of cutting state pensions and various other measures that had
begun in 1997 to ward off crisis had largely been enacted but had not been fully suc-
cessful in restoring the loss of market confidence.
The Brazilian government's new 1999 program was comprised of front loaded fiscal
adjustments, including planned reduction primarily at the Federal level.5" Specifically,
primary surplus targets were to rise from 1.8 to 3.0 percent of gross domestic product.5 6
The overall federal deficit was to fall from 5.6 percent of gross domestic product in 1998
to 3.6 percent in 1999.1'
Taxes were to increase, including that on corporate transactions.5 8 Moreover, the
states were expected to do their share in reducing the deficit by agreeing to certain targets
set by the government.5 9 The Senate was to limit borrowing, such as new bond issues,
and provide further limitation of deficit financing of the public sector.6"
In addition to the above, a wide ranging set of fiscal and administrative support
policies were proposed or enacted.6 These included a new planned Fiscal Responsibil-
; -Act tht cAn,,Jvfd Qt deht henchmarks, a Social Security constitutional amendment
that would cap state pension contributions, as well as limits on the size of the state
bureaucracy, tax reduction, and further privatization.
On the monetary side, the objective of price stability was to be furthered with the
above fiscal policies as well as the use of indirect monetary instruments. These include
lengthening the public debt maturity and other measures to reduce the cost of capital,














As to banking policy, the previous policy of privatizing state banks and further lib-
eralization in 1998, continuing the pre-1997 program, was listed as a positive confidence
instilling achievement. Implementation of the Basle capital adequacy standards at higher
levels than required by law (Basle recommends 8 percent for tier one capital, the rule
was 11 percent in Brazil for 1999, and the top domestic banks had 15 percent to back
up their savings) was another positive development. 63 Moreover, a capital charge against
counter party operations of derivative operations had been required since 1997, and




The Basle twenty-five principles of banking supervision were adopted and the goal
was year 2000 compliance.6 The World Bank was involved with bringing more sophis-
ticated technical banking supervision practices and a series of initiatives; resulting in
better risk management and transparency were the result.
Further, the exchange rate band was to be widened with gradual devaluation of the
Real. 66 Trade liberalization with MERCOSUR with respect to tariff barriers was to be
continued (it was in fact curtailed), and other broader liberalization measures, consonant
with the WTO, were pledged.6 ' Finally, Brazil's statistical base was to be adjusted in
line with international standards so that the degree of public sector debt was not over-
reported.
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D. THE 1999 STABILIZATION PROGRAM TAKES EFFECT
By February 1999, there was reason to fear that Brazil was on the verge of col-
lapse.69 Inflation was rising, and industrial output was falling. Concerns that Brazilian
banks might not have sufficient reserves had begun to be addressed, and soon thereafter
contingent credit lines from private sources in the United States were arranged.
By June 1999, a climate of skepticism regarding government policymaking began to




64. Id. Counterparty risk is a subject of increasing concern among the Basle Committee as
well. See Roubini, supra note 1, Prudential Supervision and Basle Committee on Banking
Supervision for an extensive collection of reports on the above issues.
65. IMF Brazil Letter of Intent, supra note 6.
66. Id.
67. Id; see also http://wto.org, and http://www.oas.org, http://vvww.iadb.org.
68. IMF-Brazil letter of Intent, supra note 6.
69. See N. Yamaguchi, Brazil's Former Foe, Inflation Creeps Back, (REUTERS, Feb. 12, 1999). The
best article I've seen on understanding the core issues that give rise to a potential banking
crisis, as opposed to a more generalized financial crisis, is Daniel C. Hardy, Are Banking Crises
Predictable? FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT (IMF, Dec. 1998), available at http://www.imf.org.
Here the authors argue for greater credit lines and other contingency measures. This is
especially important as may be required to repay short-term dollar denominated debt.
70. The IMF-Brazil Memorandum of Economic Policies, March 8, 1999, summarizes the changes
in programs prior to this date to minimize capital out flows. For background information
on the problem in a broader canvas, see Ricardo Ffrench-Davis and Stephany Griffeth-Jones,
COPING WITH CAPITAL SURGES (Reiner, 1995). In the Brazil situation, specific concerns were
expressed in the Brazilian Senate and in the newspapers (Gazeta Mercantil) that the Central
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But if the public news about the handling of the crisis was not completely positive
and the possibility of a liquidity crisis was being seriously prepared for, the confidence
building process in Brazil was remarkably about to take a turn for the better.
The IMF, which had approved the use of $44.5 in conditional stand by funding
in February, had to be pleased with the economic performance of the country and its
decision to provide standby assistance. This is because gross domestic product seemed
to be on the decline to only 1 percent rather than 4 to 5 percent by July 1999.7 1 Inflation
that had been targeted at 11 percent was only 7.4 percent, and was expected to go to less
than 5 percent by end of 2000.72 Fiscal performance in reducing the deficit was better
than expected, and the measure to take prompt corrective action to reduce the state,
federal, and municipal deficits were going significantly better than anticipated.73
Still, the Fiscal Responsibility Act had not been passed by mid-year, although this
was expected to resolve itself by the end of the year. Streamlining of the pension sys-
tem had helped contain expenses as had other administrative reforms enacted in 1998
and initiated seriously in 1997. (By December 1999, the Brazilian Supreme Court ruled
that the above civil service reform was unconstitutional, although this did not seem to
substantially negatively affect the economy).
Monetary policy had shifted to a flexible exchange rate system as of January 1999,
and the effect had been viewed as positive from the IMF's perspective in diminishing
inflationary expectations. 74 Specifically, the government instituted a formal inflation-
targeting framework in March, and monetary aggregates were kept within a narrow
range.75
The banking system had weathered the crisis well with adequate hedging of their
Real positions vis-a-vis the dollar in advance of the crisis. Moreover, non-performing
loans had risen only slightly from 7 percent to 8.9 percent owing to the recession, and
the capital adequacy system instituted and recommended by Basle and adopted by Brazil
had meant that a strong overall capital base was in place.76
The pace of foreign direct investment was high, flowing in at a remarkable$18 billion pace, " ....... t..di.. the financial turmil.. 7 7 Re.a1,bly, a alance..f
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payments surplus was projected for the end of 1999, and the trade balance was expected
to improve with the United States, even as reports for the first two quarters seemed less
than promising.78 In short, the coordinated IMF and Brazilian government program
(with some private sector and other international financial institutions assistance) was
yielding positive results that were fueling confidence in Brazil's ability to manage its way
out of the devaluation into a smoother stabilized future.
Bank may have tipped off certain large banks and allowed them to protect certain depositors
and investors.









V. The International Financial Architecture and the Brazilian
Reform Program: Do the Five Pillars of the New
Architecture Really Matter?
From the vantage point of early 2000, the success of the IMF-Brazil program seems
even more remarkable. Positive economic growth is expected this year, in this, the second
year of stabilization and no banking or liquidity crisis has taken shape. The November
IMF review shows that the decline of 1 percent of gross domestic product and only 1
percent of inflation was substantially better than had even been predicted six months
earlier.7 9 Some setbacks had taken place, notably the unconstitutionality of social secu-
rity reforms, but the government had responded to this and other setbacks, uniformly,
with prompt corrective action. In sum, it seems that the capability of the Brazilian poli-
cymakers to enact reform policies since the first Cardoso administration, and the ability
to plan for and foresee that a devaluation crisis might hit the Real throughout 1997-98,
were valuable in preventing a deeper crisis and ensuring quicker recovery.
The stabilization plan implemented represented the opportunity of crisis to engage
in deeper reform than politically might otherwise have been allowed, and it was seen
positively by the market. The Brazilian government was able to issue Euro-Bonds by
November 1999.80 Inter-bank credit lines were being rolled over at a 97 percent rate,
and were being supplemented by various private sources."' Progress was being achieved,
it seems, amidst the pain of recession.
A. THE ELEMENTS OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
ARCHITECTURE IN THE BRAZIL REFORM PLAN
The core elements of the new international financial architecture are comprised of
many details but are essentially comprised of transparency, international standardiza-
tion, financial sector strengthening, private sector involvement, and contingent credit
lines support. This section reviews to what extent these concepts were part of the strat-
egy and tactics involved in the Brazil crisis, the first post "new international financial
architectural" crisis.
1. Transparency
As to the objective of transparency, a review of the IMF proposals in this regard sug-
gests that this was an issue of limited public concern for the IMF. Specifically, the IMF did
not ask that any public sector accounts be opened up further to public scrutiny. More-
over, it did not request further clarification of bank or other financial sector reporting
requirements vis-A-vis Brazil's letter of intent and memorandum of economic policies.
79. IMF-Brazil Economic Policies and Technical Memorandum of Understanding, Nov. 12, 1999.
80. Id.
81. Id.; see http://www.imf.org/external/country/BRA/index.htm for the most complete informa-
tion as to the IMF's relationship with Brazil, including commentary on lessons learned by
the Brazilian Central Bank Chief Antonio Fraga, as well as IMF Managing Director Stanley
Fischer.
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It did, however, demand that public sector spending be reduced, a problem caused
by the patronage practice of rewarding supporters with jobs-and then pensions for
which they really did not have to work. In this sense, the IMF was able to bypass the
simple request for greater transparency and attack the greater evil of corruption as a
means of raising economic performance.
Likewise, the IMF did not have to set out transparency per se as an overriding
policy objective as to bank supervision. This is because Brazil was extensively involved in
such a program with the IMF and was therefore required as a condition of participation
in various aid programs to maintain certain prudential standards, such as loss ratios
for nonperforming loans and capital adequacy generally. In other words, Brazil had
plans in place and was operationally executing a clean up of its banking operations.
The sale of many state banks to the private sector had required, as a pre-condition of
sale, greater transparency than might previously have been required for the sales to be
closed. In short, transparency as a process was well underway in banking as a by-product
of liberalization, and of cooperation with the World Bank and other institutions in
implementing tough, new regulatory and supervisory safeguards.
2. International Standardization
The impact of international standardization likewise pre-dates the Brazilian reforms.
Specifically, Brazil had adopted the Basle capital adequacy standards, the Basle off-balance
sheet reporting requirements to minimize value at risk for derivatives. It was in the
process of adopting the Basle twenty-five Principles for Effective Banking Supervision,
as indicated in the IMF-Brazil memoranda. 2
Perhaps more significantly, the damage that Brazil had suffered by having its
consolidated public debt considered together rather than just the Federal debt as a
percentage of gross domestic product was remedied. This meant that bond agencies
assessing creditworthiness would not have to add a restricted rating that could raise
interest rates or other risk premium, beyond that required by international standards.
Brazil's return to the international bond markets in the second half of 1999 was no
doubt helped by the widespread recognition of and adjustment for this statistical
reporting anomaly.
3. Financial Sector Strengthening
As the above has shown, a strong component of the IMF program was geared toward
enhancing the quality of services through improved supervision and reform. This was
already underway, and although the IMF reports do not so indicate, there is little doubt
that prompt corrective action measures and improved monitoring have resulted from
82. See Roubini, supra note 1, Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (Sept. 1997); see Joseph
Norton, DEVISING INTERNATIONAL BANK SUPERVISORY STANDARDS (Kluwer, 1995); Cf Eva
Holz, LA INTEGRACION DE LOS SISTEMAS BANCARIOS (1997) for a discussion of Mercosur
systems; See also http://www.sela.org for discussion of related issues related to Latin Amer-
ican banking; see also more generally, Ernesto Aguirre & Joseph Norton, REFORM OF LATIN
AMERICAN BANKING SYSTEMS, Joseph Norton, THE EXPERIENCE OF DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
AND THE POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR LATIN AMERICA AND OTHER DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
(Kluwer, 2000).
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the crisis. The fact that the banking sector has not suffered in any substantial way and
remains robust, indicates that this area was in any event well-prepared for devaluation,
and not at the heart of the problem in the same way that fiscal and administrative
reform was.
4. Private Sector Involvement
The obvious idea behind this was to eliminate or mitigate the problem of moral
hazard so that if a banking or another important economic institution failed, it was not
immune from the consequences. This is due to the Asian system of close partnerships
between private and public sector, an issue that is less important in the Brazilian context.
Still, this is not to say that there are not some concerns about favoritism and the passing
of inside information to selected depositors by the Central bank prior to the devaluation,
resulting in the preservation of capital through capital flight.
5. Contingent Credit Lines
There is little question that the IMF's provision of standby credit, and the private
sector commitment of contingent credit lines, eased the way for Brazil to come out of
the depths of its crisis. The concept of public contingent credit lines is primarily focused
on preventive measures. In the case of Brazil, it was private sector involvement for major
U.S. financial institutions that helped contain the crisis from turning into a possible
collapse during the crucial January 1999 to July 1999 period. Paying off short-term
debt with private debt rollovers was required with Brazil and major commercial banks
agreeing to help.83 Contingent credit lines have not thus far been used in the exclusively
public arena and are based on legally and economically complex set of parameters that
may make their potential use as a useful policy tactic moot.
84
83. See Roubini, supra note 1, homepage-Private Sector Involvement in Crisis Prevention and
Resolutions: Market Views and Recent Exposure, ch. 5.
84. In a recent Foreign Affairs spring 2000 article, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)
Special Task Force on Strengthening the International Financial Architecture observed that
setting firm standards as to the proper ratio of credit available relative to reserves in the
IMF was an important issue. It also focused on the unwieldy nature of the contingent credit
line process. The CFR task force recommended that more specific criteria be worked out
for the percentage of lending facilities for a country relative to reserves and noted that
Brazil had required substantially greater facility than prior practice and guidelines might
suggest. For contingent credit lines, the same emphasis on setting standards was discussed,
and it was indicted that the use of public credit seemed unlikely, absent processes that
permitted quick response to crisis. For the full Special Task force report, see Carla Hills
and Peter Peterson, Safeguarding Prosperity in a Global Financial System: The Future Inter-
national Financial Architecture (Sept. 1999). For a sweeping view of the above issues from
the IMF perspective, see Michael Camdessus, ECONOMIC PROSPECTS FOR THE AMERICAS
UNDER A NEW FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE; June 2, 1999 conference remarks, available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/1999/060299.htm. The most recent summary of the
IMF's efforts is the Acting Managing Director to the International Monetary and Financial
Committee on Progress in Reforming the IMF and Strengthening the Architecture of the
International Financial System, Apr. 12, 2000.
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B. ASSESSING THE INTELLIGENCE GATHERING AND RESPONSE
CAPABILITIES OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE
IN DEALING WITH THE BRAZILIAN CRISIS
The above snapshot does not, of course, capture the full range of proposals or all
the dimensions captured by the new international financial architecture in leading to
meaningful reform in Brazil. More importantly, we must measure the degree to which
the Brazilian reform program has benefited from the conceptual focus on the above
areas and the operational execution of proposals consistent with this in preventing and
containing crisis. In short, do these core elements provide a foundation for improved
intelligence gathering and response to crisis?
The answer, of course, is mixed. The new financial architecture proposals are useful
in heading off a crisis, but they do not address the problem of structural imbalances,
such as investors perceived in Brazil's fiscal accounts. Moreover, they cannot control
the outflow of capital that may arise in response to impending devaluation, further
weakening a currency's downward spiral.
On the other hand, the improvement in information systems through imple-
mentation of better transparency, international standardization, and financial sector-
strengthening provide an improved early warning system to what was the case prior to
the Asian crisis asset bubbles and private sector over-borrowing became apparent. They
may therefore not have been as specifically useful to heading off crisis in Brazil as they
might be in other parts of the world. But, that only means that this was a different type
of crisis than that which struck Asia, not that the tools do not have some current and
future utility.
As to responding to crisis, there is no question that the financial sector-strengthening
program already underway was most helpful in containing the extent of the crisis. Like-
wise, contingent credit lines are, when moral hazard is properly accounted for and
diminished, a potentially useful tool to be applied in responding to crisis.
C. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
In light of the above, it is therefore suggested that the international financial archi-
tecture proposals had a modestly positive effect on the ability of Brazil's decision makers
to adopt legal and institutional reform measures that matter. Crisis prevention and man-
agement capabilities are significantly enhanced by the broad agenda proposed by the new
international financial architecture proponents. Indeed, to do nothing means that coun-
tries like Brazil may lack the political cover, not to mention the risk management tools,
to prepare for market speculators and others that may seek to pounce on weakness. Fur-
ther continuation of this agenda provides a basis for the strengthening of international
financial law and institutions.
